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OF COUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
Military coups are, for the most part, outside the American
political tradition. Talk of military coups, however, tends to surface at
times when politics are divided and the nation is under stress. Such
talk has resurfaced during the recent election season and a YouGov
poll of Americans even found that support for a military coup, while
perhaps not actually strong, was certainly stronger than many might
hope.1 This talk has gained increased salience after the recent failed
coup attempt in Turkey.2

*
Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Tennessee College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School; B.A. University of Tennessee. I
would like to thank Kateri Dahl for truly first-rate research assistance on this
paper. In addition, Ben Barton, Austin Bay, Brannon Denning, Charles Dunlap,
and Nick McCall provided helpful comments on an earlier draft that was posted
on SSRN.
1. Ellen Brait, Poll Finds Almost a Third of Americans Would Support a
Military Coup, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/sep/11/military-coup-some-americans-would-vote-yes
(the
actual
question asked if respondents could imagine supporting a military coup. The
number rose to 43% when respondents were asked if they would “hypothetically
support the military stepping in to take control from a civilian government which
is beginning to violate the constitution.”); see also Shaun King Foresees U.S.
Getting a Helping of Turkey if Trump’s Elected, TWITCHY.COM (July 16, 2016),
http://twitchy.com/dougp-3137/2016/07/16/shaun-king-foresees-us-getting-ahelping-of-turkey-if-trumps-elected/ (Black Lives Matter activist Shaun King,
after the July coup attempt in Turkey, foreseeing that something similar will
happen in the United States if Donald Trump wins the election); James Kirchick,
If Trump Wins, a Coup Isn’t Impossible Here in the US, L.A. TIMES (July 19,
2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kirchick-trump-coup-20160719snap-story.html (Jamie Kirchick arguing the same thing). This talk continued
after the election, not only on fringe sites like InfoWars, (Will Coup d’Etat
Overturn Trump?, INFOWARS (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.infowars.com/will-coupdetat-overturn-trump/), but also in respectable publications like The Spectator.
See Paul Wood, Will Donald Trump Be Ousted In A Coup Or Just Impeached, THE
SPECTATOR (Jan. 21, 2017), http://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/will-donaldtrump-be-assassinated-ousted-in-a-coup-or-just-impeached/ (quoting an unnamed
“national security intellectual” at a Washington cocktail party as saying “it will
end in a military coup. Tanks on the White House lawn,” and adding “He was the
second person to tell me that at the party . . . . Impeachment—however far-
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Although the prospect of such a change has inspired such
thrillers as Seven Days In May3 and The Last Caesar,4 the actual risk
of an American coup has always been comparatively small. This is
because a number of characteristics in the American constitutional
framework, and in American political culture and traditions, make
such an eventuality more difficult than it might otherwise be.5
“More difficult” is not the same as “impossible,” however, and
the absence of any military coup at the federal level, 6 or even a
significant threat of one, over the nation’s more-than-two-century
lifetime does not mean that such a thing could never happen. In this
Article, I will briefly discuss the subject of military coups in general
fetched an idea—is not the most outlandish possibility being discussed in this
town as the 45th president is sworn into office.”).
2. John Feffer, Would Americans Ever Back a U.S. Military Coup?, INST. FOR
POL’Y STUD. (July 20, 2016), http://www.ips-dc.org/americans-ever-back-u-smilitary-coup/.
3. FLETCHER KNEBEL & CHARLES W. BAILEY II, SEVEN DAYS IN MAY (1962).
4. EDWARD MCGHEE, THE LAST CAESAR (1980).
5. See infra pp. 12–18.
6. Although the United States has never seen a coup at the federal level, it
has experienced some degrees of military unrest, including at least one coup at
the state level. In the “Philadelphia Mutiny,” state militia members, angry over
not being paid, occupied the Capitol where the U.S. Congress then met. This
experience was one of the reasons for locating the U.S. Capitol on federal
territory, outside the confines of any state. Chasing Congress Away, UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART, AND ARCHIVES (June 1,
2015), http://history.house.gov/Blog/Detail/15032422770. In Rhode Island’s Dorr
Rebellion, opponents of the sitting state government (which operated under a preRevolution royal charter) set up their own state government after clashing with
the charter government’s forces. Paul M. Thompson, Is There Anything Legal
About Extralegal Action? The Debate Over Dorr’s Rebellion, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV.
385 (2003). The question of which state government was the lawful government of
Rhode Island gave rise to the famous “political question” case of Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. 1 (1849). In 1898, after losing an election because of heavy turnout from
black voters, white Democrats in North Carolina overthrew the state government
with an armed militia in what is considered the only successful coup d’état in U.S.
history. How The Only Coup D’Etat In U.S. History Unfolded, NPR (Aug. 17,
2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93615391. And in
the famous “Battle of Athens” in 1946, returning veterans discovered that sheriffs’
deputies had absconded with ballot boxes. Fearing fraud, they broke into the
National Guard Armory, armed themselves, and subsequently seized the ballot
boxes from the deputies. Jennifer E. Brooks, The Battle of Athens, THE
TENNESSEE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY AND CULTURE VERSION 2.0 (Dec. 25,
2009), https://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entry.php?rec=43. See also Tennessee
Tragedy: The Battle of Athens, WBIR (Nov. 5, 2014), http://legacy.wbir.com/
story/news/local/2014/11/05/tennessee-tragedy-the-battle-of-athens/18569511/
(describing the sequence of events of the Battle of Athens).
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and review the features of the American polity that make them less
likely here, and some danger spots to be avoided in the future. I will
then suggest some steps that might help to ward off trouble.

COUPS D’ÉTAT, A SHORT GUIDE
A coup d’état, according to Edward Luttwak’s influential
treatise, consists of “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government
from its control of the remainder.”7 Or, in another formulation, “[a]
coup d’état . . . is simply a means of seizing power quickly and
effectively within an existing framework so that, once established,
one can either operate within that framework or . . . slowly . . . alter
it. As such, the coup d’état is favoured equally by the forces of both
right and left.”8
This is distinct from civil war, in which large segments of
society are mobilized against one another. In the classic coup d’état
the nation wakes up one morning to hear that the political leadership
has been arrested or co-opted, while the radio and television stations
are under the control of the new regime. The civil servants go to work
as usual, just following orders from a new batch of superiors. In the
face of such a fait accompli, few are inclined to resist, particularly if,
as is usually the case, the old regime wasn’t overly popular anyway.
The appeal of a coup is thus that it is comparatively
inexpensive and bloodless, compared to a civil war: “[c]oups d’état are
the most effective device for regime change in modern history. But
why should that be the case? What makes a coup a coup is the
concept of political action by a small group using force of arms.”9
A coup is effective because it is fast and cheap compared to a
civil war. Rather than seizing the entire nation, the plotters merely
seize the levers of power. As Luttwak writes:
It can be conducted from the “outside” and it operates
in that area outside the government but within the
state, which is formed by the permanent and
professional civil service, the armed forces, and police.
The aim is to detach the permanent employees of the
7.
8.
9.

EDWARD LUTTWAK, COUP D’ETAT: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK 27 (1979).
GREGOR FERGUSON, COUP D’ETAT: A PRACTICAL MANUAL 13 (1987).
DAVID HEBDITCH & KEN CONNOR, HOW TO STAGE A MILITARY COUP: FROM
PLANNING TO EXECUTION 56 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
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state from the political leadership . . . . The apparatus
of the state is therefore to some extent a “machine”
which will normally behave in a fairly predictable and
automatic matter. A coup operates by taking
advantage of this machine-like behavior: during the
coup because it uses parts of the state apparatus to
seize the controlling levers; afterward because the
value of the “levers” depends on the fact that the state
is a machine.10
Or, as Gregor Ferguson observes:
A coup d’état is not a revolution, nor is it a guerrilla
campaign, nor yet a simple mutiny in the armed
forces. A revolution implies a mass uprising against a
particular ruling class; the introduction of a new
order, a catastrophic event in the nation’s history.
While a coup d’état may herald the start of a
revolution, there is nothing “popular” about it. It is (or
should be) a swift, precise operation aimed at
displacing the current rulers and replacing them with
oneself or one’s own nominees. One reason why the
coup d’état is popular is because it is so quick: A
revolutionary war could take a long time . . . Besides,
even a successful revolutionary war will inevitably
alienate at least part of the population . . . and may
result in serious long term damage to an economy
upon which one soon may have to rely.11
Given the appeal of seizing power quickly and comparatively
easily through a relatively modest application of force, the real
question is not why coups happen, but rather, why they do not
happen all the time: “Instead of asking why the military engage in
politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first
sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and
civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly
superior organization. And they possess arms.”12

10. LUTTWAK, supra note 7, at 20–21.
11. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 13.
12. SAMUEL E. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS 5 (2002).
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In fact, coups are quite common. According to research by
Naunihal Singh, a majority of countries in the world experienced at
least one coup attempt in the second half of the twentieth century.
Between 1950 and 2000 there were 471 coup attempts in independent
countries with populations over 100,000, of which slightly more than
half (238) succeeded. Among non-Western countries, there were at
least 30% more coup attempts than democratic elections for the
executive office. In some countries, he notes, one might fairly say that
coup attempts are the basic mechanism for changes in
administration.13
Coups are less common than they might be because for a coup
d’état to succeed, the government being overthrown, and the polity in
which it operates, must possess certain characteristics. It is the point
of this Article that the American Constitution, along with traditional
American political culture in general, tends to operate against those
characteristics, and to make the American polity more resistant to a
coup than most. It is also notable, however, that some changes in the
Constitution and in political culture may tend to reduce that
resistance, and for that reason should be viewed warily. This Article
will briefly describe the nature of coups d’état, look at the
constitutional and cultural traits that make the United States a poor
target, discuss the ways in which those traits may be changing over
time, and then suggest some actions calculated to make the United
States more, rather than less, coup-resistant.

Characteristics of Coup-Resistance
Stereotypically, nations subject to coups d’état tend to be
comparatively small, centralized, and underdeveloped, though this is
not always the case. By contrast, nations that are large,
decentralized, and developed are more resistant. In his survey of
coups d’état, The Man On Horseback, Samuel Finer divides nations
into four categories, descending from those at the highest level of
political development (the United States, Britain, the Scandinavian
countries, etc.) down to those in which the political culture is so
undeveloped that governments (and coup plotters) can ignore public
opinion because the populace is so weak or apathetic that it just
doesn’t matter.

13. NAUNIHAL SINGH, SEIZING POWER: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF MILITARY
COUPS 51–58 (2014).
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Those countries that Finer regards as having a “mature
political culture” are, it will be noticed, largely of northern European
geography or culture. (I think that it is fair to consider such
Anglosphere nations as Australia and New Zealand, which Finer
includes in his first rank, as such.) Countries in his second category—
Germany from the Empire to the rise of Hitler, Japan during the
interwar period, France after the Third Republic, the former Soviet
Union—are called countries of a “developed political culture.” In such
countries, public resistance to a coup would be significant, and
something the military would have to reckon with. Countries in the
third category, places like Turkey, Egypt, Argentina, etc. are deemed
to possess a “low political culture,” with public resistance to a coup
likely to be small. And in countries of the fourth category, “minimal
political culture” (e.g., Haiti) the opinion of the masses is
unimportant.14 Finer writes:
As long as the listed characteristics persist in such
societies, the legitimation of military rule would be
unobtainable in the first group, resisted in the second,
fluid in the third, unimportant in the fourth.15
One might thus assume that the United States—being large,
decentralized and politically developed enough to anchor Finer’s first
category—is immune to a coup d’état, rendering the question
unimportant. And I suspect that’s precisely what most people do
think, supposing that they even give the question any thought at all.
But Finer’s categorization is by no means permanent. When
The Man On Horseback was originally published in 1962, South
Korea was included in the same category as Egypt.16 Today, however,
it has almost certainly risen at least to category two. It is difficult to
imagine a military coup in Seoul today proceeding with the ease of
yesteryear. Likewise, Germany today is likely far more resistant to a
coup than the Germany of 1932.
But if countries can move up in coup-resistance, then it must
also be the case that they can move down. Anglo-American traditions
of democracy, civilian control of the military, and the orderly
transition of power are not written in stone. Nor is America (or, for
14.
15.
16.

FINER, supra note 12, at 88–89.
Id. at 89.
Id.
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that matter, England) as culturally Anglospheric as it was several
decades ago.
None of which is to say that the United States is on the verge
of a coup d’état today. But to the extent that the United States is
more resistant to such than many other nations, it’s worth looking at
the characteristics, both constitutional and political-cultural, that
make it so. Changes to those characteristics may also have the
consequence of lowering that resistance, perhaps weakening the body
politic sufficiently that an opportunistic infection (the seizure of
power by military or civilian plotters after a coup) might set in.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Given that the Framers intended for the Constitution to make
it difficult for any one person or group to gather all power into their
hands, 17 it is perhaps not surprising that many aspects of the
Constitution function to make a coup much more difficult. Among
these are the separation of powers among the three branches, the
division of power between the states and the federal government, and
the various provisions of the Bill of Rights. In addition, various other
provisions may serve as inhibitors, if not to a coup itself, then to postcoup consolidation of power. By making such consolidation more
difficult, of course, they also function as deterrents to some degree.

Separation of Powers
Under the Constitution, powers are parceled out to the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. Of these, the grant of
power to the Executive is the stingiest: Though the President is
granted executive power,18 that power consists mostly in executing
tasks, and making use of powers, delegated by Congress. When
presidents step outside the sphere of legislatively authorized action,
their powers are much smaller.19
Of course, capturing the Executive branch is generally the
goal of coup-plotters. As the Framers realized, the Executive is the

17. THE FEDERALIST, NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2.
19. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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branch possessed of energy and the ability to act.20 Thus, any coup
would need to neutralize, or control, the presidency.
But control of the Executive is not enough. For the
government to act with even a semblance of legitimacy, 21 the
Executive must be executing laws passed by Congress, and those acts
must be upheld by the judiciary. 22 Control of Congress, whose
members are dispersed throughout the DC metropolitan area when it
is in session, and across the nation when it is not, would be
considerably more difficult. Control of the Supreme Court might not
be especially difficult, but the geographic dispersal, and independent
tendencies, of the lower federal courts would make it likely that many
acts by the coup-perpetrators would be declared illegal by some court,
providing a basis for resistance. Thus, to the extent that separated
powers obtain, a coup becomes more difficult, and the follow-up to an
initial seizure of power more challenging.

Federalism
The division of power between the federal government and
the states provides a much stronger barrier to a successful coup. The
essence of a successful coup d’état is speed and economy of force:
seizing control of the parts of government where power is
concentrated before anyone who might contest that control has a

20. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing energy in the
Executive).
21. This need for legitimacy stems from the fact that direct military rule,
even in countries that frequently experience coups, seldom works well. Instead,
the military government is usually replaced, often quite quickly, by a civilian
government that is ultimately controlled by the coup-perpetrators. FINER, supra
note 12 at 4–5. As Luttwak writes:
An element in our strategy after the coup is half-way between
the information and the political campaign; the problem of
‘legitimizing’ the coup. Clearly, the coup is by definition illegal,
but whether this illegality matters, and whether it is possible to
counteract its effects, will depend on the total political
environment of the country in question.
LUTTWAK, supra note 7, at 172.
22. In Edward McGhee’s THE LAST CAESAR, this need for Congressional
legitimation—and amnesty—provides the Vice President with an opportunity for
a daring counter-coup, though (not to give too much away) things don’t end
especially well. MCGHEE, supra note 4, at 224–26.
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chance to act; and doing so with a small enough group of conspirators
that word doesn’t leak out ahead of time. But the federal structure of
the United States means that, entirely independent from the
dispersal of power among the branches of the federal government,
each state is itself a distinct, detached power center. State governors
control their own military forces, National Guard and State Guard
units of not-inconsiderable capability, 23 as well as state law
enforcement agencies and state bureaucracies generally. Under
existing law, of course, state National Guard units24 (though not the
distinct State Guard 25 units) are subject to federalization by
presidential order. Should state governors choose to ignore such
orders and instead deploy their forces to oppose a coup, however, this
legality would be of little use to the plotters.
In addition, state legislatures and even state judiciaries
constitute significant centers of potential resistance. In times of
division and confusion, they might have substantial influence over
the behavior of their constituents and local officials. Coup plotters
might want to suborn or neutralize such figures—at least the
governors of the most important states—but expanding a covert plot
to include so many disparate individuals will almost certainly result
in exposure. At some point, the plot to overthrow the government
grows big enough that it constitutes a revolution, or perhaps the
opening round of a civil war; a move that is far more daunting given
the great expense of civil wars and revolutions.

The Bill of Rights
As Akhil Amar has noted, the Bill of Rights itself has
structural features,26 some of which are of relevance here. The First

23 . There are approximately 445,000 National Guard members serving
(approximately 340,000 Army National Guard members and 105,000 Air National
Guard member). U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL BY RESERVE
COMPONENT AND RANK/GRADE (UPDATED MONTHLY):
(SEPT. 2016),
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.
24. Rod Powers, Military Reserves Call Up Authority, THE BALANCE, (Sep. 8,
2016)
https://www.thebalance.com/military-reserves-federal-call-up-authority3332677 (describing the statute that authorizes federalization of National Guard
units by presidential order); see also Perpich v. Dept. of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990)
(explaining dual state/federal role of National Guard troops).
25. 32 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
26. Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights As A Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132 (1991) (arguing that the structure is as important to the interpretation of
the Bill of Rights as the language of the individual rights).
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Amendment, 27 through its guarantee of free communication, will
make it more difficult for coup-plotters to seize control of information
and communications, always a vital part of seizing power.28 Though
constitutional litigation is unlikely to be of much relevance,
constitutional norms may well be: Commands emanating from the
government (or, post-coup, the “government”) may be ignored,
especially in the crucial early hours or days, by citizens used to
speaking freely and unaccustomed to complying with orders not to do
so.
Such resistance may not persist in the face of soldiers with
guns, but the coup-plotters can’t send soldiers with guns everywhere,
or even to very many places at once. These problems are vastly
complicated by the Internet, which may overshadow traditional
sources of communication like television and radio in importance.
There may be technical solutions to the Internet problem (more on
this later), but one cannot simply seize a few studios, broadcast procoup propaganda, and assume that the masses will remain ignorant
of what is actually going on. Other First Amendment norms, like
freedom of assembly (plotters can declare a curfew, but if 10,000
people show up, will they really order them shot? Will troops obey
orders to do so?) and freedom of religion (churches form alternate
power centers, with their own internal organization, which is no
doubt why some regimes distrust them) may also pose problems.
The Second Amendment,29 which plays a major anti-coup role
in popular lore, may also come into play. The armed citizenry of the
United States forms a potentially enormous military force: Tens or
hundreds of millions of people with weapons.30 Some of those people
are quite expert, and some of the civilian-owned weapons are quite
sophisticated. (The official “state rifle of Tennessee,” the Barrett .50
caliber, is effective at ranges of more than a mile and can take out

27. U.S. CONST., amend I.
28. See, e.g., Luttwak, supra note 7, at 168–72 (describing the importance of a
“monopoly of communication.”).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
30 . Though numbers are uncertain, it is estimated that one in three
Americans owns a gun. Given that many gun owners own multiple guns, it’s
entirely possible that there are more guns in America than people. At the very
least, this one-in-three figure suggests over one hundred million armed
individuals. Maggie Fox, One In Three Americans Own Guns, NBC NEWS (June
29, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/one-three-americans-own-gunsculture-factor-study-finds-n384031.
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aircraft or thin-skinned armored vehicles.31) On the other hand, that
citizenry is unorganized, and it’s unclear whether it might stir itself
in time to provide effective resistance. A million people with rifles,
unorganized, are not an army: that takes discipline, organization, and
some degree of direction. Absent some sort of pre-planning (e.g., a
group of citizens makes plans in advance to show up at the federal
building with guns if the Internet goes down) or some sort of
organizational framework (if I were a coup plotter, I might worry
about the Veterans of Foreign Wars or other groups consisting of
people with military experience), they are unlikely to act before a
coup is complete.
To be fair, this might not be true. The State of Virginia alone
has approximately 2.44 million citizens who own guns (29% of its
population), 32 all of whom live within a few hours’ drive of
Washington, DC. If even one percent of them, over 24,000 people,
decided to drive to Washington and overturn the new government,
the coup-plotters would not stand a chance. And that does not
account for additional numbers from nearby states like West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, etc. But a successful coup d’état is about
organizational superiority on the part of the plotters, and unless such
an armed “flash mob” formed very quickly, it would be too late. An
armed populace might serve as a substantial deterrent to overbearing
government after a coup, but without some sort of advance
preparation, it probably wouldn’t react fast enough to stop or
overturn a coup in the crucial opening hours.33

31. Christopher Ingraham, Tennessee’s New Official State Rifle Is So
Powerful It Can “Destroy Commercial Aircraft”, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/26/tennessees-newofficial-state-rifle-is-so-powerful-it-can-destroy-commercial-aircraft/.
32. Andy Kiersz & Brett LoGiurato, Here’s Where You’re Most Likely to Own a
Gun,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(July
3,
2015),
http://www.business
insider.com/gun-ownership-by-state-2015-7.
33. In a piece written shortly after his Coup of 2012 essay (discussed infra),
Col. Charles J. Dunlap expressed skepticism that armed citizens could
successfully revolt against the United States government should it become
tyrannical. The scenario Dunlap addresses is considerably different from the one
describe here, though I would suggest that the last twenty years of, at best, mixed
results against lightly-armed irregulars suggest that the United States military
might not perform as well as Dunlap believes. Charles J. Dunlap, Revolt of the
Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 676 (1995).
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Other Constitutional Norms
Beyond the First and Second Amendments, other
constitutional norms may play a role, not so much in the early hours
of a coup attempt, as in the later days in which a regime attempts to
consolidate power. Again, these provisions may not be judicially
enforced—or, more likely, attempts at judicial enforcement will be
uneven at best—but they will establish a baseline against which the
regime’s legitimacy is assessed, and which will form the basis for
possible legal actions or prosecutions in later days if the coup regime
fails (or, perhaps, even if it succeeds).
Thus, for example, constitutional requirements like the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,34 the Fifth Amendment’s
requirement for indictment by a grand jury,35 the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination 36 and the Sixth Amendment’s
right to trial in the district where the crime was committed (which, in
the event of resistance to the coup, is likely to contain quite a few
potential jurors sympathetic to the resistance), 37 and the Eighth
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishments,38 as
well as Article I Section 9’s protection of the writ of habeas corpus,39
will limit the actions of a post-coup regime that aspires (as most are
likely to do) to some claim of constitutional legitimacy. Such limits
may be overridden to a degree (as Lincoln did, by suspending the writ
of habeas corpus by executive fiat) 40 but they will nonetheless be
constraints. And, to the extent that these limits are ignored, that will
be a rallying cry for coup opponents that is likely to have considerable
force in a nation as legalistic as America.
Additionally, in countries where coups are frequent, the
armed forces often position themselves (or are positioned by the
countries’ political traditions) as protectors of the constitution or
political order who are themselves located outside of politics as

34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
40. See generally Bruce Ragsdale, Ex Parte Merryman and Debates on Civil
Liberties During the Civil War, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2007),
www.fjc.gov/history/docs/merryman.pdf.

2017]

Of Coups and the Constitution

13

usual.41 In such countries, looking for the armed forces to step in
when civilian government is out of hand is, in a sense, not
extraconstitutional at all.
The United States, however, as befits a legalistic nation, has
its own institution that serves this purpose: The United States
Supreme Court. Though the Supreme Court isn’t really outside of
politics (but then, neither is the Argentinian Army), it is outside the
day-to-day grind of politics as usual, and, having a different schedule
of personnel rotation and a different institutional character and
constituency, it too serves as a check outside of day to day politics.
Thus in America, when things seem out of kilter, people often look to
the Court. To the extent that the Court fills this role (or is seen to),
the ability of the military to claim legitimacy on this basis is much
reduced. (In addition, perhaps, the removal procedures in the 25th
Amendment, which provide for the removal of a president upon
certification of a majority of the Cabinet that he/she is unable to
serve, provide an additional safety valve).

CONSTRAINTS WITHIN POLITICAL CULTURE
Aside from the Constitution’s specific provisions, many
aspects of American political culture—both civilian and military—
that promote accountability and limited government powers also
militate against a coup. Their efficacy in doing so, of course, depends
on how deeply and widely the culture is embedded. And, to the extent
that political culture changes, they may be less effective in the future.
Most significantly, of course, is the tradition of civilian control
over the military. This was a major concern of the Framers, who
viewed standing armies with deep concern. (One commentator
describes the Framers as possessing an “almost panic fear” of a
standing army).42 It is for this reason that the civilian president is

41. See FINER, supra note 12 at 35–39 (discussing notion of “custodianship” in
numerous countries).
42. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 143 (1994). “Professional
armies had no ‘permanent and perpetual’ role in America until 1763. Rather, the
settlers’ jealousy of their personal right to have weapons was magnified by what
one historian characterized as their ‘almost panic fear’ of a standing army, a
legacy handed down from generation to generation by forbears ‘who, if they were
Southern Cavaliers recalled Cromwell and his major-generals, and if they were
New Englanders the attempts of the Stuarts to raise regular armies and govern
through their sanction.’” (quoting KATHARINE CHORLEY, ARMIES AND THE ART OF
REVOLUTION 216 (1973)).
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made commander-in-chief of the armed forces and that
appropriations for the Army (which poses a greater threat to domestic
liberty) are limited to two years, while those for the Navy (which does
not) are under no such limitation.43 It is also the reason for the (now
mostly, but not entirely, obsolete) reference to the (civilian) militia as
“necessary to the security of a free state” in the second amendment.44
But these constitutional provisions merely underpin a larger
cultural tradition. When President Harry S. Truman fired General
Douglas MacArthur, General MacArthur—despite the title of one of
his biographies, 45 and the near-Imperial splendor of his rule in
Occupied Japan—simply retired. Nor was that outcome in serious
doubt, though powerful and popular generals in many other nations
might have acted otherwise.46
And “civilian control” does not simply mean “presidential
control.” To the extent that the commander-in-chief issues orders that
are clearly illegal or unconstitutional, members of the armed forces
are expected to refuse to obey, a point recently reiterated by General
Michael Hayden, in response to campaign statements by candidate
Donald Trump:
Referring to Trump’s suggestion to torture suspected
terrorists and kill their families, Gen. Michael
Hayden told TV host Bill Maher, “If he were to order
that once in government, the American armed forces
would refuse to act.”
“You’re required not to follow an unlawful order. That
would be in violation of all the international laws of
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.
44. See generally, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide To The Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 466–482 (1995) (describing classical
conception of militia). See also Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, How To
Stop Worrying And Learn To Love The Second Amendment, 91 TEX. L. REV. 89,
94–97 (2013) (“If a well-regulated militia is ‘necessary to the security of a free
state,’ then it follows, presumably, that a state lacking such a militia is either
insecure or unfree.”).
45. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR (2008).
46. Id. at 644–47 (describing MacArthur’s acceptance of his removal). Popular
reaction, on the other hand, was fierce, described by Richard H. Rovere and
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. as “so violent and spontaneous a discharge of political
passion. . . . there has been nothing to match it since the Civil War. . . Appearing
at Griffith Stadium, Truman was booed—the first public booing of a President
since 1932.” Id. at 648.
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armed conflict,” Hayden said. “I would be incredibly
concerned if a President Trump governed in a way
that was consistent with the language candidate
Trump expressed during the campaign.”47
Though television host Bill Maher characterized such an
action as “a coup,” Hayden noted, correctly, that refusing to follow an
illegal order is not a coup.48
This refusal to follow illegal or unconstitutional orders means
that, even if the office of the presidency were seized in a successful
coup, many members of the armed forces might refuse to follow any
orders from an unconstitutional office-holder; that would be doubly

47. Sylvan Lane, Ex-CIA chief: Armed forces would have to disobey Trump,
THE HILL (Feb. 27, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/271061-ex-cia-chiefarmed-forces-would-have-to-disobey-trump.
48 . Nick Gass, Ex-CIA Director: Armed Forces Would Ignore Trump,
POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-liveupdates-and-results/2016/02/cia-director-armed-forces-ignore-trump219918#ixzz41QYEoGUa; see also Mathison Hall, I Swear I Will Not Commit War
Crimes, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/2016/03/23/brussels-attacks-belgium-war-crimes-trump-column/82125068.
Hall writes:
When I raised my right hand and took the oath of office as a
commissioned officer in the United States military, I swore to
defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I would bear true faith
and allegiance to the same.
I did not swear to follow all orders given to me. I did not swear
allegiance to the president of the United States or to any other
leader. I swore allegiance to an ideal that, while certainly
imperfect and at times unevenly implemented, defines us as a
people and a nation. My years of training and education
highlighted two additional key precepts of this republic and its
incredibly powerful military: the armed forces are subordinate
to civilian leadership, and members of the military are
obligated to disobey unlawful orders. In other words, while we
are subordinate to the civilian leaders elected by the people, we
are also bound by our oaths of office to disobey orders which
conflict with the Constitution and the laws of the land.
Hall is writing about unconstitutional actions aimed at foreign citizens.
Presumably this duty to disobey illegal and unconstitutional orders would be felt
more deeply if those orders targeted fellow-citizens.
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true, of course, if the orders themselves seemed to be illegal. In this
regard, Luttwak’s characterization of the governmental apparatus as
a “machine” that will reliably operate so long as the person at the top
pulls the levers,49 breaks down. Where the “machine” is made up of
individuals who can be expected to refuse to obey when the levers are
pulled by the wrong person, or in the wrong way, the coup becomes
much more difficult.
The duty to disobey illegal orders is, as noted, part of military
training. The civilian bureaucracy, alas, is generally not so
instructed. Nonetheless, the general culture of civilian supremacy,
and orderly legal transitions of power, might make a coup more
difficult here, too. This is perhaps particularly true within the
paramilitary law enforcement and intelligence bureaucracies, where
many members have military backgrounds, or at least a military
ethos.
Add to this a general hostility to military government and a
sense that military coups are things that lesser nations do, not things
that should happen here, and those plotting a coup in the United
States face a steeply uphill battle. At least, they face such a battle
today. But what of tomorrow, and years hence? And therein lies the
problem.

Law, Culture, and Change
In the earlier sections of this Article, I have laid out briefly
why it is that a coup d’état has never been a serious possibility in the
United States. But the characteristics of the United States that make
a coup impossible are not themselves immutable. As America
changes, it may change in ways that make a coup more, rather than
less, likely. Some of these changes may be deeply unfortunate in
themselves; others may be desirable for other reasons, but may
nonetheless make the seizure of the government by a band of plotters
more plausible. I will discuss these, and then conclude with some
suggestions for changes that might make America more coupresistant in the future. In short, these trends that promote
centralization, lack of accountability, and government control of
communications are more dangerous. Trends in the opposite
direction, on the other hand, tend to make a coup less likely. From
this perspective, the present picture is not altogether comforting.

49.

LUTTWAK, supra note 7, at 20–21.

2017]

Of Coups and the Constitution

17

Separation of Powers
The civics-book statement of American government is that
Congress passes laws that must be signed by the President (or passed
over a veto), and that those laws must be upheld by the judiciary to
have effect. In practice, today’s government operates on a much more
fluid basis, with administrative agencies issuing regulations that
have the force of law—or, all too often, “guidance” that nominally
lacks the force of law but that in practice constitutes a command—
which are then enforced via agency proceedings. To the extent that
administrative agencies have more power, and operate under less
scrutiny and with less need for explicit delegations from Congress,
control of the Executive branch becomes much more significant, and
Luttwak’s machine is more likely to be responsive to those who pull
on its levers.
As Charles Cooper writes, since the effective demise of the
non-delegation doctrine and the rise of the Chevron doctrine, in which
courts defer to agency interpretations of their own statutes,
administrative agencies have become largely independent of
congressional, judicial, and at times even presidential control:
The bottom line is that our constitutional order has
been subverted, perhaps irreversibly: First, the
administrative state is free to exercise legislative
power, delegated by Congress, over virtually every
aspect of life, and Congress need not provide even so
much as an “intelligible principle” to constrain its
regulatory discretion. Second, the administrative
state has the last word, binding even on the Supreme
Court, on what ambiguous statutory provisions mean,
including on the jurisdictional question of whether
Congress actually authorized it to interpret the
statute in the first place. And, finally, the
administrative state has executive power to enforce
its laws, as it alone has interpreted them, liberated
from any meaningful review by the courts and often
from any meaningful control by the president. It can
truly be said that, in the main pursuits of everyday
life, we are ruled by a one-branch government. And
the “experts” who run it are accountable to no one:
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They are not elected, nor are they controlled by those
who are elected. And they certainly are not angels.50
Furthermore, it seems likely that to the extent that civilians,
law enforcement, and others become used to obeying bureaucratic
diktats that lack a clear basis in civics-book-style democratic
processes, the more likely they are to go along with other diktats
emanating from related sources. This tendency to go along with
instructions without challenging their pedigree would seem to make a
coup more likely to succeed, just as a tendency to question possibly
unlawful or unconstitutional requirements would tend to make a coup
less likely to succeed. A culture whose basis is “the law is what the
bureaucrats say it is, at least unless a court says different,” is in a

50 . Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, NATIONAL
AFFAIRS (Fall 2015); see also Appalachian Power v. EPA, 208 F. 3d 1015, 1020
(D.C. Cir. 2000):
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress
passes a broadly worded statute. The agency follows with
regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases,
ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the
agency issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining,
interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in
the regulations. One guidance document may yield another and
then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may
spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and
more detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated
entities. Law is made, without notice and comment, without
public participation, and without publication in the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. In the age of the
Internet, the agency does not need these official publications to
ensure widespread circulation; it can inform those affected
simply by posting its new guidance or memoranda or policy
statement on its web site. An agency operating in this way
gains a large advantage. “It can issue or amend its real rules,
i.e., its interpretative rules and policy statements, quickly and
inexpensively without following any statutorily prescribed
procedures.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr. Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 85 (1995). The
agency may also think there is another advantage –
immunizing its lawmaking from judicial review.
This is a far cry from what most people think is involved in our system of
“checks and balances,” and to the extent this behavior has been normalized, it
makes rule by decree considerably less likely to create a backlash.
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different place than one whose starting impulse is “it’s a free
country.”

Federalism
As mentioned earlier, the states continue to be an important
counterweight to federal authority. The presence of so many
independent power centers, with state governors commanding nontrivial amounts of military force and with state politicians often
enjoying substantial bases of support within their own states (and
occasionally outside of them), makes the process of consolidating
power much more troublesome for coup plotters. This remains true.
Though states are in some ways less independent than they
were a century, or even a half-century, ago, they are in other ways
more independent. The revitalization of state governments during the
latter half of the 20th century has probably increased their political
base of support, as state governments have modernized and have
become more representative post Baker v. Carr.51

The Bill of Rights
The First Amendment used to be parodied by the famous
statement that “freedom of the press belongs to the man that owns
one.” Though in colonial times, a printing press represented a
relatively small investment, and newspaper production was virtually
(and sometimes literally) a cottage industry, changes in technology
and efficiencies of scale in production, distribution, and
newsgathering meant that by the mid-19th century, newspapers were
fewer in number, and more concentrated in ownership—a trend that
continues to the present day.52
Broadcasting too—in part for technical reasons, and in part
as the result of regulatory choices53—has always been an industry in
which the number of outlets was comparatively limited and in which
control was comparatively narrow. Unlike some other nations, the
United States does not have government-controlled broadcast media
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 235–36 (1962).
52. See GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS 89–114 (2006) (describing
concentration of traditional media and flourishing of alternative Internet news
sources).
53 . See generally L.A. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1987) (describing development of broadcasting industry in the
United States, and the structural consequences of regulatory choices).
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along the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation, but the
American broadcast field has nonetheless been relatively
concentrated and fairly uniform in ideology.54 Furthermore, until late
in the 20th century, telephony was a tightly controlled monopoly. It is
not a coincidence that a key element in Knebel & Bailey’s coup novel,
Seven Days In May55 involved control of a key long-distance telephone
exchange in Utah, and of a switch allowing the President (or whoever
controlled it) to take over broadcasts of the three major TV networks.
In the era of the Internet, cable TV, and assorted other
communications, it would take more than a few squads of soldiers at
crucial locations to seize control of communication. Even if the major
broadcast networks were taken over, citizens would still have many
other ways of receiving news (in fact, if the major broadcast networks
were taken over or shut down, it is entirely possible that most people
would find out about it first via Facebook, Twitter, or talk radio).56 If
an important part of staging a successful coup involves establishing a
monopoly over mass communications and blocking potential
opponents from communicating in order to organize, then the current
environment does look unfavorable.
On the other hand, persistent calls for a governmentcontrolled “Internet kill switch”57—justified, ostensibly, by the needs

54. PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND MEDIA HABITS: FROM FOX
NEWS TO FACEBOOK, HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES KEEP UP WITH POLITICS
9–11 (2014) (indicating a relatively concentrated ideology in the audience of news
outlets).
55. KNEBEL & BAILEY, supra note 3.
56. During the July 2016 Turkish coup attempt, Turkish President Recip
Erdogan used Facetime to bypass the coup plotters’ control of state media. Sean
McMeekin, A Coup In Facetime, THE AMERICAN INTEREST (July 16, 2016),
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/16/a-coup-in-facetime/
(“In
Ed
Luttwak’s next edition of Coup d’état: A Practical Handbook, he may wish to add:
make sure to confiscate your enemy’s iPhone.”). See also Emre Kizilkaya,
Facetime Beats WhatsApp in Turkey’s Failed Coup, AL MONITOR (July 24, 2016),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attemptwhatsapp-facetime.html (“If this coup attempt had occurred in the 1970s, the
plotters could have sent a few soldiers to raid the public broadcaster and the
largest private media outlets to control the flow of information. Thanks to current
technology, that wouldn’t work today.”).
57. Declan McCullagh, Renewed Push to Give Obama an Internet Kill Switch,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/renewed-push-to-giveobama-an-internet-kill-switch/; see also Dana Liebelson, The Government’s Secret
Plan To Shut Off Cellphones And The Internet, Explained, MOTHER JONES (Nov.
26,
2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/internet-phone-kill-
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of cyber defense or anti-terrorism—could undercut that advantage. If
whoever controlled the government could shut down the Internet, or,
more insidiously, filter its content to favor the plotters’ message and
squelch opposition while presenting at least a superficial appearance
of normality, then things might actually be worse than they were in
Knebel & Bailey’s day. At the very least, such a degree of Internet
control would vitiate the advantages listed above.
In addition, where we used to talk about “the Internet” as a
means of massive citizen-to-citizen communication, we now talk
about social-media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. These
platforms have their advantages—for example, it is much easier for a
citizen to subscribe and post opinions and news using such platforms
than it was (or is) for a citizen to set up his/her own website. But they
are also much easier to control. Taking Facebook or Twitter down, or
filtering their content (already controlled by algorithms that users
seldom understand),58 is much easier than taking down hundreds or
thousands of independently run blogs, chatrooms, and websites. So, to
the extent that Internet communications architectures become de
facto corporate monocultures, the benefits of Internet mass
communication become less significant.
Naunihal Singh characterizes a coup as primarily a
“coordination game” within the military: everyone wants to end up on
the winning side, since a civil war is so expensive, and the penalties
for being on the losing side are so severe.59 He suggests that social
media is less important than traditional Big Media, in part, because
social media communicates less information about who is winning: if
the coup plotters have captured control of major broadcasting
stations, or the government retains it, that is in itself, a data point
that others can use to assess how the coup is going. Social media
posts are more uncertain in their provenance or reliability.60 It may
be that social media is more effective at undercutting claims made by
coup-plotters, as when Turkish President Erdogan demonstrated via
Facetime that he was still alive and independent, than at promoting
them. On the other hand, Singh notes,
switch-explained (describing the mechanics and genesis of the existing “kill
switch”).
58. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Could Facebook Swing An Election?, USA TODAY
(Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/04/18/facebookmark-zuck
erberg-criticism-donald-trump-h1b-visas-technology-column/83181214/.
59. SINGH, supra note 13, at 222.
60. Id. at 224–25.
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Because of the anonymity of the Internet, one person
could send out multiple tweets and even faked photos
from a variety of different Potemkin identities
purporting to show the challengers are strong and in
control of a variety of different symbolic targets. Such
dissimulation could be persuasive for a few days, long
enough to have an impact on the coup attempt.61
On the Second Amendment front, the number of guns in
civilian hands is, as noted, very large. 62 In addition, though the
overall number of Americans with military training has probably
declined since the end of conscription, the number of Americans who
compete in shooting sports, including “practical shooting” events such
as IPSC or three-gun competitions, is undoubtedly higher, since most
of those events are of recent vintage. As a result, there would
probably be roughly as many Americans equipped to resist a coup
with force today as in past years.63
On the other hand, as noted, trends toward social
fragmentation and disconnection64 mean that those Americans would,
to an uncertain but large degree, tend to be disorganized. A
comparatively small number of armed civilians who could turn out to
oppose a coup on short notice is more likely to make a difference than
a significantly larger number who might turn out days or weeks after
it is completed. An America in which more citizens were engaged in
various high-trust social groups and networks is likely to be more
resistant to a coup than one in which citizens tend to be atomized and
out of touch.
61. Id. at 227.
62. See supra note 32.
63. The International Practical Shooting Confederation (IPSC) was founded
in 1976 and has grown since then. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE SHOOTING
COMPETITION, http://www.ipsc.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). Further, the
National Rifle Association now “sanctions over 11,000 shooting tournaments and
sponsors over 50 national championships each year.” COMPETITIVE SHOOTING
PROGRAMS, http://competitions.nra.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
64. See generally CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE
AMERICA 1960–2010 (2013) (discussing the evolution of American society since
1963 that lead to the formation of classes and ultimately arguing that the
divergence into classes “will end what has made America America”); ROBERT
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2001) (reviewing trends in social and civic engagement and arguing
that Americans need to reconnect with each other).
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Political Culture and Social Capital
Despite all the factors laid out above, the most significant
barrier to a coup d’état over American history has probably stemmed
simply from the fact that such behavior is regarded as un-American.
Coups are for banana republics; in America, we do not do that sort of
thing. This is an enormously valuable sentiment, so long as the gap
between “in America” and “banana republics” is kept sufficiently
broad. But it is in this area, alas, that I fear we are in the worst
shape.
When it comes to ideological resistance to coups d’état, there
are two distinct groups whose opinions matter: the military and
civilians. Both are problematic.
The military satire site Duffelblog recently ran an item
entitled: General Mattis Crosses Potomac With 100,000 Troops;
President, Senate Flee City. The piece opened:
In an unprecedented turn in American history, retired
Marine Gen. James Mattis, several years after being
dismissed by the President and exiled to his estate in
the countryside, marched on the national capitol early
Tuesday morning with an army over one hundred
thousand strong.
This number includes at least ten infantry legions,
several aviation and artillery legions, and multiple
cavalry cohorts.
“I come in peace, by myself, in order to hand-deliver a
Memorandum of Concern to the Commander in Chief
and the Senate,” said Mattis in a press conference. ”I
am moving on foot at a leisurely pace, with no ill
will. If these American citizens choose to take a stroll
with me, then who am I to turn down their
companionship?”
The contents of the so-called memorandum are
unknown, but are rumored by Mattis’ close advisors to
contain paragraphs addressing unconstitutional acts
by the administration and the Senate. Alarmed by the
amassing of troops sympathetic to Mattis over the last
week at Fort Myer, the Senate, the President, and

24

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[48.2:1

various generals attempted to recall various combat
divisions to Washington to defend the city.
These included the 101st Airborne, 82nd Airborne,
10th Mountain, and 3rd Infantry Divisions, in
addition to the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force.
“We even attempted to contact NAVSURFLANT and
SUBLANT,” confided one Senate aide as he packed
his Datsun to flee northward. “All we got was
laughter and then static.”
The summoned units all either ignored their
movement orders, or by the next morning had joined
forces with Mattis’ ad-hoc command.
Mattis was apparently done waiting, and crossed the
Potomac on landing craft, escorted by an honor guard
from MARSOC.
After setting fire to the National Archives and
sabotaging key infrastructure, the cabinet and most
members of the Senate fled north toward New York
and Boston in cars, vans and whatever other vehicles
they could commandeer.65
This scenario, with its obvious allusions to the end of the
Roman Republic, is not very likely, though the enthusiasm with
which many online commenters received it is perhaps troubling.66
Yet in a way, it distills the concern. General Mattis may be
the most respected and revered military officer living; he has even
been spoken of as a potential Presidential candidate.67 Were things to

65. General Mattis Crosses Potomac With 100,000 Troops; President, Senate
Flee City, DUFFLEBLOG (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.duffelblog.com/2013/12/
general-mattis-crosses-potomac-100000-troops-president-senate-flee-city/.
66 . Though if the sentiments of Internet commenters are the tool of
assessment, civilization is already doomed. Or, perhaps, has already suffered its
doom.
67 . Tim Mak, The Secret Movement To Draft General James Mattis for
President, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 8, 2016, 1:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
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look bad enough, would the military actually back him—or a
comparable figure at some later date—in large numbers? This
question is perhaps more salient given that Mattis is now serving as
President Trump’s Secretary of Defense.
The answer to that question depends on military culture and
at present the answer is certainly “no.” Yet there are some troubling
trends in civilian/military relations that suggest that we should be
more worried about this subject in the future than we have been in
the past.
And I am not the first to notice this. Back in the 1990s, Col.
Charles Dunlap published a piece that, though still fictional, was far
less whimsical than the Duffelblog piece quoted earlier. Dunlap’s
piece, The Origins Of The American Military Coup of 2012, 68 was
published not in a satirical webzine, but in Parameters: The Journal
of the Army War College. Dunlap’s piece was not a piece of satire, nor
an ignored dissent from a disgruntled officer, but the winner of a
National Defense University essay competition. Col. Dunlap was
honored by then-Gen. Colin Powell at the awards ceremony.69
Dunlap’s essay looked ahead to a military worn out and
disgusted after decades of being given tough jobs by its civilian
masters, while those masters behaved irresponsibly. In Dunlap’s
fictional future history, the armed forces, being far more trusted and
(apparently) effective than other government organizations, were
handed more and more civilian jobs at home, and more and more nonmilitary jobs (humanitarian missions, drug interdiction, etc.) abroad.
The result was a military better suited to non-military tasks than to
actually fighting enemies abroad. A disastrous defeat at the hands of
Iran in the Persian Gulf led a military humiliated abroad and abused
at home to decide that seizing power was the only way to go.70
As Thomas Ricks wrote in The Atlantic,
Like all science fiction, Dunlap’s essay is really about
the present. His coup entices the reader to his real

articles/2016/04/08/the-secret-movement-to-draft-general-james-mattis-forpresident.html.
68. Charles J. Dunlap, The Origins of The American Military Coup of 2012,
PARAMETERS 2 (Winter 1992–93).
69 . Thomas E. Ricks, Colonel Dunlap’s Coup, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Jan.
1993), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/defense/coldunl.htm.
70. Dunlap, supra note 68.
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subject: the worrisome drift of the U.S. military into
civilian affairs.
....
Dunlap does what a good essayist should do: he
makes his reader see familiar phenomena in a new
light. As my newspaper’s Pentagon correspondent, I
pick up the Defense Department’s “Early Bird”
compendium of newspaper clippings and, since
reading Dunlap, almost every day find myself taken
aback. . . . Is “The Origins of the American Military
Coup of 2012” something to be taken seriously? Yes, it
is, even if one may be skeptical about just how likely
to occur the developments that Dunlap points to
really are.71
Happily, we made it past 2012 without a coup; though
unhappily, the years between 1992 and 2012 were more warlike than
Dunlap—who wrote at the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the
evanescent “peace dividend”—foresaw. 72 Nonetheless, Dunlap
identifies a number of concerns, most of which fall into the
political/cultural, rather than the strictly constitutional, category.
Among these concerns are:
•

A “societal malaise,” with most Americans thinking
that the country was on “the wrong track.”

•

A “deep pessimism about politicians and government
after years of broken promises,” leading to an
“environment of apathy” among voters that scholars
regard as a precursor to a coup.

71. Id.
72 . Dunlap’s 1992 essay foresaw a world sufficiently peaceful that the
military found itself occupied primarily with peacetime civilian missions, and
becoming slack in terms of actual war-fighting skills. Id. In fact, the history since
his essay was published has been one of almost nonstop military action by the
United States, from the Kosovo intervention under President Bill Clinton, to
interventions in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere under Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. See generally Therese Pettersson & Peter
Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014, 52 J. PEACE RES. 536 (2015).
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•

A strong belief in the effectiveness and honor of the
military, as contrasted to civilian government.

•

The employment of military forces in non-military
missions, from humanitarian aid to drug interdiction,
to teaching in schools and to operating crucial
infrastructure.

•

The consolidation of power within the military—with
Congressional approval—into a small number of
hands. In particular, Dunlap notes the consolidation
of armed services into a single body for reasons of
“efficiency.”73

•

A reduction in the percentage of the officer corps from
places outside the major service academies. “Academy
graduates, along with graduates of such military
schools as the Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and
Norwich University, tended to feel a greater
homogeneity of outlook than, say, the pool of ROTC
graduates at large.”74

•

A general insulation of the military from civilian life.
“[W]ell-meaning attempts at improving service life led
to the unintended insularity of military society,

27

73. “Eventually, that consideration, and the conviction that ‘jointness’ was an
unqualified military virtue, led to unification. But unification ended the creative
tension between the services. Besides rejecting the operational logic of separate
services, no one seemed to recognize the checks-and-balances function that service
separatism provided a democracy obliged to maintain a large, professional
military establishment. The Founding Fathers knew the importance of checks and
balances in controlling the agencies of government: ‘Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.’ . . . Ambition is a natural trait of military organizations and
their leaders. Whatever might have been the inefficiencies of separate military
services, their very existence served to counteract the untoward desires of any
single service . . . . Additionally they served to ensure that unscrupulous designs
by a segment of the military establishment were ruthlessly exposed. Once the
services were unified, the impetus to do so vanished, and the authority of the
military in relation to the other institutions of government rose.” Dunlap, supra
note 68, at 113–14. Whether Congress’s failure to make such a change was
influenced by Dunlap’s article is unclear, but it is entirely possible that Dunlap
had some impact.
74. Id. at 114–15.
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representing a return to the cloistered life of the preWorld War II armed forces. Military bases, complete
with schools, churches, stores, child care centers, and
recreational areas, became never-to-be-left islands of
tranquility removed from the chaotic crime-ridden
environment outside the gates . . . . Thus, a physically
isolated and intellectually alienated officer corps was
paired with an enlisted force likewise distanced from
the society it was supposed to serve. In short, the
military evolved into a force susceptible to
manipulation by an authoritarian leader from its own
select ranks.”75
Some of Dunlap’s predictions came true and others did not.
The great reduction in crime that took place beginning in the mid1990s made the contrast between the orderliness of military bases
and the “chaos” of the outside world less striking. And Congress has
not, so far, consolidated all the armed services into one for reasons of
efficiency, though the emphasis on “jointness” remains strong.
On the other hand, distrust in the civilian government and
bureaucracy is very high. A 2016 Associated Press/National Opinion
Research Center poll found that more than six in ten Americans have
“only slight confidence—or none at all” that the federal government
can successfully address the problems facing the nation. And, as the
Associated Press noted, this lack of confidence transcends partisan
politics: “Perhaps most vexing for the dozen or so candidates vying to
succeed President Barack Obama, the poll indicates widespread
skepticism about the government’s ability to solve problems, with no
significant difference in the outlook between Republicans and
Democrats.”76
As a troubling companion to this finding, the YouGov poll on
military coups mentioned earlier also found a troubling disconnect
between confidence in civilian government and confidence in the
75. Id. at 115.
76. Bill Barrow & Emily Swanson, Poll: Low Confidence in Government,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/ap-poll-publicdoubts-washingtons-problem-solving-ability-152224966--election.html?ref=gs; see
also Ron Fournier & Sophie Quinton, How Americans Lost Trust In Our Greatest
Institutions, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2012/04/how-americans-lost-trust-in-our-greatest-institutions/
256163/ (that loss of trust also extends to other institutions, like churches, local
governments, and newspapers).
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military: “Some 71% said military officers put the interests of the
country ahead of their own interests, while just 12% thought the
same about members of Congress.”77 While such a sharp contrast in
views about civilian government and the military is not itself an
indicator of a forthcoming coup, it is certainly bad news. Also
troubling are polls finding that a minority of voters believes that the
United States government enjoys the consent of the governed.78 This
degree of disconnection and disaffection, coupled with much higher
prestige on the part of the military, bodes ill.
In his essay, Dunlap quotes historian Andrew Janos, who
said:
A coup d’état in the United States would be too
fantastic to contemplate, not only because few would
actually entertain the idea, but also because the bulk
of the people are strongly attached to the prevailing
political system and would rise in defense of a
political leader even though they might not like him.
The environment most hospitable to coups d’état is
one in which political apathy prevails as the dominant
style.
“However,” Dunlap writes, “when Janos wrote that back in
1964, 61.9 percent of the electorate voted. Since then voter
participation has steadily declined.”79
Voter participation aside, politics in America has probably
become more personalized since 1964, and fewer voters are “strongly
attached to the prevailing political system,” perhaps because fewer
and fewer voters actually understand the Constitution and how the
American system of government is supposed to work.80 And although

77. Rob Quinn, Poll: 29% of Americans Could Back Military Coup, NEWSER
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.newser.com/story/212734/poll-29-of-americans-couldback-military-coup.html.
78. See, e.g., 22% Believe Government Has Consent Of Governed, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS (June 16, 2012), http://m.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/
general_politics/june_2012/22_believe_government_has_consent_of_governed
(reviewing poll data on citizens’ opinion about popular consent for government
rule).
79. Dunlap, supra note 68, at 109.
80. Sohrab Amari, The Civics Crisis, Books & Culture, CITY JOURNAL (Nov. 4,
2011), http://www.city-journal.org/html/civics-crisis-9687.html; see also TEACHING
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American politics is certainly full of sound and fury, that sound and
fury overlays a curious degree of apathy regarding actual policy
issues and outcomes as Americans lose trust not only in government,
but in almost everything else.81 On social media sites like Twitter,
this shows up as ironic posts tagged #lolnothingmatters. Such a
culture is not, I suspect, one in which righteous yeomen rise up to
defend a political system they embrace even in defense of a political
leader they abhor.
Civilians’ lack of commitment does not matter, of course—in
this context, at least—so long as the military remains committed to
constitutional government. Here there is less obvious cause for
concern, but the situation cannot be described as entirely rosy.
Indeed, some are saying that the civilian-military divide is the
deepest it has been in some time. “Service members and veterans feel
more disconnected from civilians than ever before. As the percentage
of Americans who have served has decreased to just 7% with only 1%
currently serving, fewer civilians are able to relate to their
experiences . . . . ‘Veteran populations feel misunderstood and
unappreciated.’”82
Though conscription has many disadvantages (aside from its
questionable morality), it produces a military full of people who
otherwise would not have joined. An all-volunteer force may, in
general, be superior in motivation and esprit de corps, but it is also

AMERICA: THE CASE FOR CIVIC EDUCATION (David Feith ed. 2011) (describing
widespread ignorance of civics and American government).
81 . Fournier & Quinton, supra note 76 (discussing Americans’ lack of
confidence in institutions ranging from banks and big business to media to public
school and organized religion).
82. Sarah Sicard, Civilian-Military Divide Continues To Grow As Force Size
Shrinks, TASK & PURPOSE (Mar. 30, 2016), http://taskandpurpose.com/
civilian-military-divide-continues-grow-force-size-shrinks/; see also Mary L.
Dudziak, A Growing ‘Civilian-Military’ Gap, And Its Consequences,
BALKINIZATION
(Nov.
25,
2011),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2011/11/growing-civilian-military-gap-and-its.html (describing a report that found
that more than three-quarters of adults ages 50 and older reported having an
immediate family member who had served in the military, compared to only one
third of adults ages 18–29); Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between Military
And
Society,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
1997),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
1997/07/the-widening-gap-between-military-and-society/306158/
(analyzing
a
variety of factors that have led to the military becoming increasingly separated
from civilian society).
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self-selected and likely—especially over time—to look different in
many ways from the nation as a whole.
A famous photo from Ramadi in 2007 featured a bit of
whiteboard graffiti that read, “America is not at war. The Marine
Corps is at war; America is at the mall.”83 Though bitter humor has
undoubtedly been a staple of soldiers since before the Roman legions,
this division is somewhat different, particularly since, unlike the
Roman legions, our soldiers and Marines are instruments of a
democracy and are themselves citizens.
A professionalized military—like other professions—tends to
see things through the lens of its own professionalism, and, as in
other professions, this professionalism inevitably tends to set its
members apart from society as a whole. A professional, volunteer
military is likely to be a superior organization in combat, but it is, I
think, also likely to be less connected to the society that it defends
and more likely to hang together in times of political strife.
An army of conscripts, on the other hand, is likely to be
militarily inferior because it is composed of a large number of people
who have no particular desire to be in the military, have no special
loyalty to it as an institution, and who turn over regularly. Thus, a
less professional and specialized military, though probably less
formidable on the battlefield, may also pose less risk of a coup at
home.
In fact, this phenomenon was displayed in the French “Four
Generals” plot in 1961.84 On April 22, 1961, Generals Challe, Zeller,
Jouhad and Salan, unhappy that the French government might
withdraw from Algeria, seized first Algiers, then Oran and
Constantine. Given that the greater part of the French Army was in
Algeria (and the remainder, mostly in Germany, was “only doubtfully
loyal,”)85 it appeared to some that the government was doomed to fall.
In fact, however, the government (under General DeGaulle, whom the
Army had installed after a threatened, but not quite launched, coup
in 1958) embarked upon a political attack, with DeGaulle ordering
soldiers not to obey the generals. In particular, the conscript troops
who made up most of the forces in Algeria listened to DeGaulle, not to

83. America: At War Or At The Mall?, MURDOC ONLINE (Feb. 22, 2007),
http://www.murdoconline.net/archives/4584.html.
84. See generally FINER, supra note 12, at 96–98.
85. Id. at 97.
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their commanders.86 Troops with a stronger loyalty to their service, or
their officers, might not have responded this way.
At present, there’s enough separation to be the cause of
considerable discussion. Writing recently in The Atlantic, James
Fallows observed:
This reverent but disengaged attitude toward the
military—we love the troops, but we’d rather not
think about them—has become so familiar that we
assume it is the American norm. But it is not. When
Dwight D. Eisenhower, as a five-star general and the
supreme commander, led what may have in fact been
the finest fighting force in the history of the world, he
did not describe it in that puffed-up way. On the eve
of the D-Day invasion, he warned his troops, “Your
task will not be an easy one,” because “your enemy is
well-trained, well-equipped, and battle-hardened.” As
president, Eisenhower’s most famous statement about
the military was his warning in his farewell address
of what could happen if its political influence grew
unchecked.
At the end of World War II, nearly 10 percent of the
entire U.S. population was on active military duty—
which meant most able-bodied men of a certain age
(plus the small number of women allowed to serve).
Through the decade after World War II, when so
many American families had at least one member in
uniform, political and journalistic references were
admiring but not awestruck. Most Americans were
familiar enough with the military to respect it while
being sharply aware of its shortcomings, as they were
with the school system, their religion, and other
important and fallible institutions.

86. As Gregor Ferguson writes about the Four Generals, “[B]ecause they had
apparently gained no moral ascendancy over either the French conscripts in
Algeria or the government who sent them there, the conscripts (or, rather, the
officers in those line regiments staffed mainly by conscripts) did not join the
putsch.” Ferguson also notes the sudden surge in patriotic sentiment at home:
“The people of France, like the conscript soldiers, whose apathy and indifference
kept them out of the coup, simply didn’t care about Algeria. They cared enough
about France, however, to prove to the coup’s leader, General Challe, that he
could never succeed, and so he surrendered.” FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 124.
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Now the American military is exotic territory to most
of the American public. As a comparison: A handful of
Americans live on farms, but there are many more of
them than serve in all branches of the military.87
Fallows interviewed Charles Dunlap,88 who observes that the
separation goes both ways:
“It’s becoming increasingly tribal,” Dunlap says of the
at-war force in our chickenhawk nation, “in the sense
that more and more people in the military are coming
from smaller and smaller groups. It’s become a family
tradition, in a way that’s at odds with how we want to
think a democracy spreads the burden.”
People within that military tribe can feel both above
and below the messy civilian reality of America.
Below, in the burdens placed upon them, and the
inattention to the lives, limbs, and opportunities they
have lost. Above, in being able to withstand hardships
that would break their hipster or slacker
contemporaries.
“I think there is a strong sense in the military that it
is indeed a better society than the one it serves,”
Dunlap said. “And there is some rationality for that.”
Anyone who has spent time with troops and their
families knows what he means. Physical fitness,
standards of promptness and dress, all the aspects of
self-discipline that have traditionally made the
military a place where misdirected youth could
“straighten out,” plus the spirit of love and loyalty for
comrades that is found in civilian life mainly on sports
teams.89

87. James Fallows, The Tragedy of The American Military, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan./Feb.
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/thetragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/.
88. Dunlap’s career probably wasn’t harmed by his Coup of 2012 article;
Fallows notes that he retired as a Major General and now teaches at Duke Law
School. Id.
89. Id.
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Even those who disagree with Fallows echo some of his
concerns, as Mark Seip writes:
First, there is an emotional disconnect, as Fallows
alludes. While he primarily focuses on why civilians
don’t connect with troops, he neglected to articulate
what drives the emotional divide from those in
service. From the military side, many of us feel that
we are unique to our generation in our calling; that
we rose above the self-absorbed stereotype often
associated with both Gen Xers and Millennials to
protect our nation. We accept significant time away
from our families, often subpar working conditions
compared to our civilian counterparts, and average
pay in relation to the skills we possess in order to
wear the uniform. Moreover, as our nation’s warrior
corps we assume a level of risk since time
immemorial, that our occupation entails a distinct
possibility of loss of life. Our service therefore
requires a level of confidence and self-assurance to do
our jobs and take the risks required. However, this
mentality can easily lead to pride and arrogance in
relation to those who choose not to or are unable to
serve, and a distrust of decisions made by civilian
leadership who have not faced those same risks.
Second, the widening gap is a function of exposure,
both in numbers and in proximity. As Fallows points
out, 2.5 million served in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
To provide context, according to an NPR study 8.7
million served in some capacity in Vietnam.
Furthermore, during Vietnam the majority of the
generation at that time had fathers and mothers who
served in some capacity either in WWII, Korea or
both. Today, however, the actual number and/or the
tangential family tie to the military is lower,
reinforcing the distance between those in service and
the rest of the nation.
Military bases within the United States are trending
towards two extremes. The first are those that are
isolated, due to either the need for access to large
training spaces (for example NAS Lemoore and its
strike fighters in central California) or that the
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national security mission requires it (Minot AFB and
its nuclear arsenal in North Dakota), inhibiting a
broader interaction. The second trend is towards
consolidated basing regions. With the drive for greater
efficiencies through the base realignment and closure
process, more military personnel are being relocated
into specific locations such as Norfolk for the Navy
and San Antonio for the Air Force, creating cities of
like-minded active duty or retired military. Add to all
of this what retired Lt. Gen. David Barno calls the
“gated community” mentality of bases themselves,
with housing, household shopping and recreational
activities located on or near the various facilities. As a
result, military and nonmilitary personnel have fewer
chances to interact and understand one another.90
These observations sound perilously close to those made in
Col. Dunlap’s future history almost 25 years ago. The picture is not a
dreadful one, but it is not a rosy one either. At a time when, as I
think most would agree, our civilian political culture has become
coarser and less moored to the Constitution or civil-society political
traditions, our military feels more separate from the civilian political
culture, and from civilian society in general, than it has in living
memory.

REMEDIES
So what is to be done? This is the point at which authors
traditionally whip out a sure-fire policy proposal intended to remedy
the problem they have spelled out. Alas, I have no such nostrum.
(What would it be? An Anti-Coup Amendment to the Constitution?)
But I do have some thoughts.
The most important thing—and this is really my reason for
writing this Article—is to be aware of the problem. As mentioned in
the beginning, Americans tend to regard the prospect of a military
coup as so unthinkable that, in fact, they don’t really think about it at
all. To some degree, this is a good thing. It’s better to live in a nation
where a military coup is almost unthinkable than to live in a nation

90 . Mark Seip, What Fallows Missed About the Military-Civilian Gap,
DEFENSE
ONE
(Jan.
15,
2015),
http://www.defenseone.com/
ideas/2015/01/what-fallows-missed-about-military-civilian-gap/103014/.
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where it is thought about all the time. But perhaps we should think
about the subject at least a little.
As we make changes in the political and constitutional order,
and in the structure of the armed forces, and—to the extent we have
any control over this—in the political culture, it may be useful to bear
in mind that some changes make a military coup more or less likely.
We may be willing to make some changes even if they marginally
increase the (comparatively small) risk we face now, but we should at
least think about that risk and weigh it with other factors. And
sometimes there’s no tradeoff involved.
In particular, decentralization is both strongly protective
against the seizure of power by small, well-organized groups, and
beneficial for other reasons. Setting ambition to counteract ambition
is a remedy that goes back to The Federalist, and—as in Dunlap’s
recommendation to avoid unifying the services—is one that has
particular resonance here. Likewise, strong state governments
exercising a degree of independent military force are also protective;
we should be very reluctant indeed to make changes there. We might
also want to ensure that important parts of the federal government—
the President, the Congress, the Supreme Court—are protected by
different agencies, to make it harder for a small group to seize
control. (Interestingly, this is the case now, though whether by
accident or design is unclear).
And, hardest to quantify, or even to describe accurately, but
probably most important of all, is the spirit of the citizenry. We
should strive to maintain—or, perhaps return to—the spirit described
by Andrew Janos, in which people are “strongly attached to the
prevailing political system and would rise in defense of a political
leader even though they might not like him.”91 More than anything
else, the sense that the country wouldn’t stand for such a thing serves
as a preventive not only for coup attempts, but even for the
contemplation thereof. It is my sense that we could do a lot better in
this particular regard, and I suspect that it is the single most
important consideration. A proper public attachment to the
Constitution not only makes a coup unlikely, but would also give
legitimacy to the rare—but not unthinkable—military coup that is
actually justified,92 under circumstances sufficiently horrible to make

91. Dunlap, supra note 68, at 109.
92. Coups are generally a bad thing, but they aren’t always evil or wrong.
The plot to kill Hitler, after all, was part of a military coup, and in the event of a
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it the best alternative in spite of the damage that it would do to our
political system.93
Such an attachment is more likely, of course, when those in
positions of political and cultural leadership display a prominent
attachment to the Constitution themselves. To the extent that
constitutional limits on governmental action are treated as outmoded
and unimportant when they interfere with goals of existing political
elites, those limits are also likely to be seen as less significant when
they act to protect existing political elites from extraconstitutional
governmental change. In general, an elite that is principled and selfdisciplined is in a better position to forestall a coup than one that is
not—or perhaps it is that a nation whose elite is principled and selfdisciplined is simply not ripe for a coup. Those characteristics are
more likely to be displayed by elites if they are demanded by voters,
and by intermediary organizations like political parties, interest
groups, and the press. There is no small room for improvement in this
department.

CONCLUSION
In this comparatively short Article, I have noted popular
concerns about polls relating to a military coup, and noted the ways
in which such a military takeover can occur. I have also surveyed the
various ways in which the United States Constitution, and American
political culture, make the likelihood of a military coup (a successful
one, at least) smaller than in many other countries.
My goal is not to convince readers that the United States
teeters on the brink of such a takeover now. Despite election-year
hyperbole, I do not think a military coup looms large in America’s
future. But should that ever cease to be the case, and should such an
event become likely in the near future, then it will be too late for law
review articles to do any good. One does not take up jogging, or
statins, because one fears having a heart attack tomorrow; rather,
those are low-cost remedies taken to reduce the risk of a major
problem in the indefinite, possibly distant future. I urge a similar
approach here.

rogue president, a coup might be seen as a better alternative than a dictatorship
or a civil war in a nation possessing nuclear weapons.
93 . FINER, supra note 12, at 18 (explaining that one of the worst
consequences of a coup is “a succession of further coups by which new contenders
aim to displace the first-comers”).

